Friday, 15 February 2008

President Basescu fully supports a politically independent Romanian judiciary (Jan 12, 2006)

Image: Romania's President Traian Basescu (R) and the head of the EC Delegation to Romania, Jonathan Scheele (L) shake hand during the Supreme Council of Magistrates (CSM) meeting.

(Initially published in www.romania-report.ro -- Jan 12, 2006)



As EU urges Romania to resolutely fight top-level corruption, President Traian Basescu yesterday criticized judges for their poor public image and advised them to act according to the present legal framework and not give in to any political and economic pressure.


President Traian Basescu, Justice Minister Monica Macovei and the head of the EC Delegation to Romania, Jonathan Scheele, yesterday called on magistrates to help the justice system improve its image by turning the leading magistrates' body into a example of professional ethics and by rejecting any interference in the judiciary.

To date, political party leaders cannot decide anymore who and how is to lead the judicial institutions, Basescu said yesterday in his speech at the meeting at which members of the Supreme Council of Magistrates (CSM) presented their activity report for 2005.

"Any step back to those times means you are damaging the justice system," he said, concluding that judges will have independence as long as they know how to keep it. "None of you can say 'I received a call from the president of Romania on a certain case.' (...) I am asking you to reject any interference in the justice system and to make decisions favorable to justice, not to yourselves," said Basescu, who led the CSM meeting, as the Constitution stipulates.

"I only ask you to manage the independence you have wisely earned already," was the president's message to the CSM's members.

The head of the European Commission's Delegation in Romania, Jonathan Scheele, said that the main task is to assure standards in the justice system which will allow Romania to fulfill its accession commitments. "Justice reform was qualified by the European Commission as being adequate, in October 2005. Now it is the responsibility of the system itself to apply the laws fairly, correctly and unitarily to a reasonable deadline, so citizens regain their confidence in the law's power," Scheele told CSM magistrates, urging them to transform the institution into a model of professional ethics, as it is responsible for mediating the dialogue between the justice system and the other state authorities. The Council must change the public's unfavorable perception of the justice system, Scheele said. "I express my belief that the new leading team of the CSM will continue efforts for reform within the institution and the whole judicial system," Scheele said.

The Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei said in her speech at the CSM meeting that the institution's "main role should be to improve its image from the inside," adding that good activity will lead to a better image.

Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu did not attend the CSM meeting, although he had been invited. While the meeting was in process Tariceanu held a meeting with ministers from the economic sectors and with the National Bank's governor, Mugur Isarescu, in order to debate projects for the next two years.

Tariceanu said he had received the invitation from the CSM too late, on Tuesday evening.

On Monday, Tariceanu accused the CSM and prosecutors' office of lack of efficiency and said their attitude towards high level corruption cases could have significant political consequences and might delay Romania's accession to the European Union.

However, Tariceanu yesterday said his intention was not to put the CSM up against the wall. "Romania is now up against the wall because the justice system is incapable of eliminating corruption," Tariceanu said.

Romania Report, according to Bucharest Daily News

NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East (Jan 12, 2006)

(Initially published in http://www.romania-report.ro/ -- Jan 12, 2006)

Lecture by Ariel Cohen; These remarks were delivered at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Conference held in December 2005 at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.


Seventeen years since the fall of the Berlin Wall is sufficient time to reflect upon the amazing transformation of NATO and its frontiers. From bringing the Central European states back into their European home, whole and free, to extending membership to the former captive nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, NATO has done very well indeed.


New Challenges

NATO today is a player in a world which has fundamentally changed from the organization’s beginnings in 1949. Gone are Joseph Stalin and his double-headed monster of repressive secret police and the Red Army. Gone are the Soviet Union and its global empire. Western Europe is safe from a conventional attack directed by Moscow. The bipolar, rigid world of two ideologically opposing blocs and military machines is a part of 20th century history.

However, many Europeans and Americans have died of terrorist violence in the last five years. The source of the violence is another hateful, totalitarian ideology — radical Islam. And the sources of that ideology, its training and recruiting grounds, as well as its sources of funding are in the Greater Middle East, including the Mediterranean basin, through the Fertile Crescent, and into the remote valleys and gorges of the Caucasus and Pakistan, the deserts of Central Asia, the plateaus of Afghanistan.

This is no longer a conventional threat of panzer divisions in the Fulda Gap, or intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from Totsk or Balakovo in Russia. Today’s suicide bombers may be indoctrinated by Gulf-based mullahs, trained in camps in the Northwestern province in Pakistan or in the battlefields of Iraq, funded by an illegal charity “front” in London, and execute their gruesome work in Madrid or Paris. Most important, they have the freedom to replicate their hateful views in Paris and London and on the Internet with little to nothing done to shut them down.

But there are additional threats. Russia is slowly drifting away from the common Euro-Atlantic system of values and shared net threat assessments. It is pursuing a policy to exclude NATO and the United States from Central Asia and keep the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh on ice.

While Russia participates in joint exercises with NATO, such as Operation Active Endeavor, which will include two Black Sea Fleet ships taking part in counter-proliferation activities in the Mediterranean, Moscow is threatening Ukraine not to pursue membership in the Alliance. Russia wants other post-Soviet countries to conduct all contacts with NATO through the Collective Security Treaty Organization — a new version of the old CIS Warsaw Pact that the Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin control.

Political instability and state failure in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in the Muslim states of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East, is another long-term systemic threat, which may endanger Europe and North America.

Failed leaders produce failed policies. Failed policies generate failed states. Those, like Afghanistan under the Taliban, spawn safe havens for terrorists. It is happening in Somalia and other parts of Africa, and in the Northwestern province of Pakistan. It is happening in southern Afghanistan, where thankfully NATO is expanding its operations. And it may happen in Gaza, the Northern Caucasus, the Ferghana Valley, and in the highlands of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

To be an effective provider of security, NATO is concerned today with the entire spectrum of problems and potential problems — from the Iranian nuclear and missile program, which will threaten Europe, to emerging networks of terrorist organizations which spawn cells capable of massive urban terrorist attacks in Europe.

At the same time, many politicians and analysts say that NATO cannot be everywhere and do everything. When you look on the map and see NATO in Darfur and Pakistan, you realize that even NATO, with its vast capabilities, is limited — and must limit itself — in its geographic scope and ambition.


Implementing Existing Commitments

NATO still needs to fully implement commitments it took upon itself in Prague, Berlin, and Istanbul.

At their 2002 meeting in Prague, NATO heads of state and government opened a new chapter in the Alliance’s history by inviting seven countries, including the three Baltic States, to accession talks and committing themselves to equip NATO with new capabilities to meet the security threats of the 21st century.

The two-day “transformation summit,” which took place on November 21–22, 2002, ended with the adoption of far-reaching decisions on the Alliance’s future roles and tasks. These included the creation of a cutting-edge NATO Response Force, a commitment to enhance the Alliance’s military capabilities, and a statement on Iraq. Specifically, members agreed to the following:

- NATO Response Force. A technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force will include land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly wherever needed.
- Streamlined Military Command. NATO’s command structure will be restructured into a leaner, more efficient, effective, and deployable command structure in order to meet the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.
- Prague Capabilities Commitment. Individual allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military operations, such as strategic air and sealift and air-to-ground surveillance.
- Defense Against New Threats. An agreement was reached on a military concept for defense against terrorism, and five specific initiatives in the area of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defense were endorsed to enhance the Alliance’s defense capabilities against weapons of mass destruction. Heads of state and government also decided to strengthen NATO’s defense against cyber attacks and initiate a missile defense feasibility study.

U.S.–European Union cooperation should be continuously based on the March 17, 2003, Berlin Plus agreement, which was designed to definitively resolve questions of compatibility between the EU and NATO. Berlin Plus has four elements:

- EU access to NATO operational planning,
- NATO capabilities and common assets available to the EU,
- The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (always a European) as designated commander of any EU-led operations, and
- Adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to allow for EU-run operations.

In the 2004 Istanbul Declaration, members decided to address NATO’s Mediterranean and Greater Middle East dimensions. Specifically they agreed to:

- Enhance Operation Active Endeavor, the maritime operation in the Mediterranean, to fight against terrorism;
- Offer assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces;
- Enhance individual and collective contributions to the international community’s fight against terrorism;
- Further the transformation of military capabilities to make them more modern, usable, and deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions;
- Reaffirm that NATO’s door remains open to new members and encourage Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to continue the reforms necessary to progress toward NATO membership;
- Focus the Euro-Atlantic Partnership on engaging with NATO partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia; and
- Enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue and offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

This ambitious agenda cannot be implemented with today’s level of military and security expenditure. NATO countries which dedicate only 1.1 percent–1.5 percent of their GDP to the overall effort are not pulling their weight. The current allocations are not sufficient to fully fund the Prague and Berlin Plus commitments, the war on terrorism, and out-of-area deployments, including peacekeeping missions. To survive, NATO needs to find financial resources to fund its vital missions. Otherwise, as Ben Franklin said, “Those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither.”


Fighting Terrorism

Since 9/11, the NATO leaders have reaffirmed many times that terrorism and proliferation are the current threats to the Euro-Atlantic community. Fighting in and rebuilding Afghanistan, as well as training Iraqi forces, are principal commitments that NATO is pursuing in that realm. However, even after the attacks in Madrid and London, one gets the impression that NATO does not have sufficient capabilities to fight the global war on terrorism.

While engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Darfur are contributing to providing security and training the forces, NATO can play a greater role in fighting terrorism and building new relationships and alliances in the Mediterranean, the Greater Middle East, and Eurasia—alliances that are vital to success in the new war.

The national interest in opposing the 21st century networked, borderless, jihadi movements with their terrorist organizations is not clearly articulated. Often, notions of political correctness cloud the threat assessment, the rhetoric, and the judgment of what is really at stake, which is, simply put, the survival of Western civilization.

Western institutions need to evolve to respond to jihadi threats. Today’s national armies, courts, law enforcement, security services, legal systems, and international organizations were designed in the 19th and 20th centuries to fight a different enemy: other nation-states or coalitions thereof. These were times of conventional, colonial, or ideological warfare, not terrorism empowered by weapons of mass destruction.

Those institutions were created in a different time to address different challenges. Police pursued known local criminals, who grew up in local communities. Courts applied laws and evidence rules drafted in the quaint times of the 19th century. Spies penetrated each other’s organizations, deciphered aerial or satellite photography, or collected information in diplomatic cocktail parties.

Industrial-era militaries consist of units which fight along massive front lines. They include ballistic missile regiments, fleets, tank divisions, and air armies. All this is often of little use in fighting globally networked terrorist cells.

Western societies and NATO need to evolve to answer these new challenges. The new enemy requires a new knowledge base and new skill sets. Languages, history, religion, and geography about which we once knew very little all need to be a part of the modern decision-maker’s and officer’s discourse and at the fingertips of contemporary law enforcement and intelligence officials. While millions of Arabic, Farsi, and Pashtu speakers live in Europe and the U.S., there is a shortage of operatives and translators who are fully conversant in these languages and cultures. We have not begun fighting a war of ideas. We have a hard time integrating immigrants. National court systems, especially in Europe, are slow and cumbersome in response to agile terrorist threats, as tragedies in Madrid and London demonstrated.

This evolution to adjust and win the new conflict is the greatest challenge the West is facing, and NATO, as its pre-eminent military alliance, is facing it as well.


Reaching Out to the Greater Middle East

Part of the new orientation of NATO is the Mediterranean Initiative and the Istanbul commitment to the Greater Middle East. In engaging Arab and Muslim decision-makers and militaries, using the experience of the Partnership for Peace is necessary but will be more difficult than in the former Soviet Bloc. Chris Donnelly, godfather of the Partnership for Peace, has pointed out that the cultural gap between NATO and Greater Middle East polities today is much wider than between Western and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.

However, we cannot lose time. We are living today in an era when Arab nationalism, most of all symbolized by the military regimes of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, has collapsed. Liberalism, unfortunately, is still weak. Radical Islam, from its Muslim Brotherhood brand to the al-Qaeda variety, is a dangerous ideology which threatens the well-being of Muslim societies from Marrakesh to Bangladesh. And it is surely capable of deadly attacks against the West.

The Southern Mediterranean political systems are desperately in need of fresh air. Decision-makers need to be exposed to new ideas in the realms of security. Militaries need to come under stricter civilian control and assume a role in fighting terrorism. Bringing missions from the Greater Middle East to Brussels, exposing them to NATO’s ways, expanding dialogue and cooperation will go a long way toward familiarizing these future allies with NATO’s norms and Western culture. This is likely to be a long-haul fight—much longer and slower than the European expansion and Partnership for Peace.

However, there is a threat of “mainstreaming” Islamist movements and terrorist organizations. Just as we would not suggest legalizing al-Qaeda or the Taliban, we should rule out legalization and inclusion of Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. These are totalitarian movements which advocate genocidal violence and the subjugation of women, deny full rights to people of different religions and ethnic groups, and are completely intolerant of practices of Islam different from their own. They should not be embraced. Those who embrace them do so at their own peril.


The War of Ideas

Another vital dimension of fighting the war on terrorism is the battle of ideas. Only if the West and moderate Muslims offer the masses in the Greater Middle East a future which is more attractive and realizable than the “glorious sacrifice” of jihad do we have a chance to win this war.

So far, we have failed to mobilize for a war of ideas the way we did in the Cold War against communism. Partially, this is because many still think that radical Islam is a religion rather than a hateful political ideology. Partially, it is because we have lost the touch, the institutional memory and tools we used to keep in the toolbox.

Those who remember the United States Information Agency, who have known Radio Liberty–Radio Free Europe at its prime, and who know how the West supported Soviet and Eastern European dissidents know exactly what I am talking about. Just as we helped Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, Vaclav Havel, and Lech Walesa to become the alternative leadership for their societies, we need to do it again for the Muslim world.

And just as we developed political warfare tools which made rock music, modern art, and consumer goods hip and desirable for the socialist camp to the point of bankrupting Marxism–Leninism, we need to look for ideas, symbols, and people who can marginalize radical Islam. Half of the Muslim population is women. Well, this is a good place to start. There are repressed ethnic and religious minorities, the exploited business community, just sane people who understand that jihad is destructive for them and for us, who want compatibility and coexistence with the West. There, too, are good places to start.

No doubt, Muslims themselves can and need to fight this battle for themselves, but we need to help them to ensure our own survival. NATO needs to think how to make political warfare part of its doctrine and operations.


Russia and Eurasia

One area where secular Muslim societies and moderate Islam coexist and thrive with Christians and Jews is in the former Soviet areas. NATO should maintain and expand the Partnership for Peace with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan.

However, the recent developments in Uzbekistan cause concern. Russia to a large degree has been behind the hard line undertaken by Islam Karimov’s regime after the tragedy in Andizhan. Russian dezinformatsiya operations may be behind the paranoid belief in Tashkent that the U.S. was behind the Andizhan riots, and even that there are contacts between the U.S. and Tahir Yuldash, the head of the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, an al-Qaeda–affiliated terrorist group.
Russia wants to be an autonomous player in Eurasia. Its post-communist unreformed security and foreign policy elites feel more comfortable with Chinese communists and Iranian mullahs than with Western politicians and security planners. The Soviet-era mistrust of NATO and the U.S. is running high — and that mistrust is being encouraged in high places.

Stratospheric oil prices may allow Russia to continue this policy for a while. However, the difficult demographic, health, and social conditions at home sooner or later will force Moscow to reconsider its approach. For now, Russia fans the fears of “orange revolutions” in Central Asia and the Caucasus, calling for regimes there to use force against their own people.

After its departure from Uzbekistan, the U.S. needs to rely on the forward operations base (FOB) at the Manas airport in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and negotiate for another one in Tajikistan. Russia is concerned that the U.S. may establish bases in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even Turkmenistan (despite the fact that the latter is most likely impossible as long as Turkmenbashi rules the country with an iron fist). As NATO bases in Romania and Bulgaria are coming on-line, the chain of bases from the Black Sea through the Caspian and into Central Asia will be a great priority for the U.S. global military posture.

Russia has many other concerns. It is worried about Poland’s participation in the American missile defense program. In the latest meeting between the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, the Russian side threatened to stop military industrial cooperation with Ukraine if Ukraine joins NATO.

Russia is also apprehensive about withdrawal of its military bases from Georgia and opposes deployment of NATO peacekeepers along the Azeri–Armenian line if and when the two countries sign a peace agreement. Of course, such a deployment would be predicated on the willingness of NATO members to deploy peacekeepers.

With that, it is important for NATO to continue to engage Russia. Thus, the Active Endeavor counter-proliferation naval exercises, in which Russia takes part, are important. So is Russia’s ability to take part in peacekeeping operations using its Fifteenth Brigade, along the lines of a successful Russian deployment in Bosnia in 1996–1999.

Most important, NATO should entice Russia to train its officers and civilian decision-makers to facilitate military reforms and bring the military under more enhanced civilian control. Recent hostilities in the Northern Caucasus demonstrate that today’s Russian Army and security forces do not possess the training, fortitude, and esprit de corps needed to stem the Islamist insurgency in the region. In view of this, expanding Russian commitments in Central Asia seem foolhardy at best.

Ukraine. The debate on Ukraine’s membership in NATO will depend on a number of factors, especially political development in Ukraine, such as the March 2006 parliamentary elections. Moscow, no doubt, will react with vitriol should Ukraine be invited to join. It tripled the prices of natural gas it supplies to Ukraine.

So far, according to public opinion polls, a minority of Ukrainians support their country joining NATO. Kyiv saw its first anti-NATO demonstration, reportedly 30,000 strong. Supporters and opponents of membership may push for a national referendum — this is what President Victor Yushchenko has promised. A victory for the pro-Russian forces who oppose Ukraine’s membership in the parliamentary elections could delay that issue for years to come.

Finally, it is membership in the European Union, with its attendant economic reforms and subsidies, which most Ukrainians covet. However, this is hardly in the cards after the failure of this year’s European Constitution referendum in France and the Netherlands.

The Caucasus. NATO so far has not deployed any meaningful contingent in the Caucasus. However, the “unfreezing” of conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and, most important, in Nagorno–Karabakh may put new requirements on the Alliance.

Romualdas Razuks, NATO’s representative in the Caucasus, said that if both parties so request, NATO may deploy peacekeepers to the Azerbaijan–Armenia border. However, many members’ forces are under pressure, and it will not be easy to find sufficient troops. The same goes for Abkhazia.

Only when Russia is convinced by NATO to stop supporting separatists can the situation really change. Thus, encouraging members of the Partnership for Peace to follow their Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs), which Georgia and Azerbaijan submitted in 2004 and Armenia submitted in the summer of 2005, is the best way to arrive upon regional cooperation by the three South Caucasus states under the NATO umbrella.

A similar situation applies to the Trans-Dniester conflict in Moldova. Russia is not interested in ending the conflict, believing that a pro-Moscow, communist exclave in the vicinity of the Southeastern NATO flank is to Russia’s strategic advantage. Thus, Western pressure to “unfreeze” the conflicts and find common ground with Russia must continue.


Conclusion

NATO has reached a new watershed in which it needs to seriously evaluate both its geographic scope and the spectrum of threats it is willing to address. The Alliance’s leaders need to view its capabilities with clarity and sobriety. NATO needs to approach future missions with realism, both military and economic.

The first order of the day is triage—agreeing on threat assessments and defining which missions are vital for NATO members’ interests. Clearly, integrating the Balkans and expanding ties with Ukraine are missions most members agree on. Beyond that, NATO needs to balance ambition and funding. It is difficult to have an ambitious deployment policy or far-reaching and expensive partnerships while budgets stagnate or decline.

Some experts caution that NATO should not attempt to grab every mission, thus dispersing and dissipating its strength. It needs to hold Article V sacrosanct, build strength from within, and remain a “political clubhouse” while following the path articulated in Berlin and Prague. Indeed, post-expansion integration and interoperability, combined with improving the doctrine, building airlift and high-tech capabilities, and evolving NATO’s personnel skill set to fit 21st century threats, are vital for the Alliance’s survival and war-fighting ability.

There are also visionary leaders, like former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who believe that NATO needs to focus on fighting terrorism at home and limit deployment in faraway lands. He calls for building global alliances with like-minded democracies, such as Israel, Australia, and Japan. As far as security in Central Asia is concerned, I would also suggest expanding cooperation with Turkey, a veteran NATO member; with India; and, in certain cases, with Pakistan.

One thing is clear: NATO members need to share their threat assessments and agree upon the best ways to fight these threats. Workable strategies in the Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, and the war on terrorism, need to be developed. NATO also may play a role in the future sanctions against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. This may be a serious challenge for which NATO needs to be ready.

NATO needs to build on the Istanbul Declaration, expand the Mediterranean Dialogue, and examine expansion of ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Having Arabs and Israelis under the same neutral roof of military cooperation may create an environment of building trust and understanding. Disseminating the Western notion of civilian control over the military and security forces may go a long way in modernizing Middle Eastern military and security establishments and spreading initial notions of democratic civil–military relations.

In Eurasia, NATO needs to develop ties with the three South Caucasus states and expand, to the degree possible, training and cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. NATO should be ready to resume ties with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan when feasible.

Finally, the Alliance should expand ties with Russia beyond the NATO–Russia Council, to include peacekeeping exercises, officer training exchanges, and selective joint maneuvers. Above all, NATO has to assist Russia in enhancing civilian control over the military and enacting a military reform which makes Russia’s forces modern, compact, and defensive.

To conclude, NATO members need to provide leadership, develop policies, and find means — both financial and personnel — to deal adequately with the increasingly unstable environment along the Alliance’s frontiers. The stakes are too high: survival of our civilization. Failure is not an option.

________________________

By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. -- Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Institute for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Conference held in December 2005 at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

Gas crisis: Russia’s ‘tour de force’ calls for European reassessment of energy issues (Jan 3, 2006)



(Initially published in www.romania-report.ro -- Jan 3, 2006)


European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana urged Moscow and Kiev to resume talks, as EU energy officials prepared to meet in Brussels on Wednesday to discuss the crisis. Europe imports a quarter of its natural gas consumption from Russia, and 90 percent of those imports are delivered via Ukraine.

Meeting in Kiev with ambassadors from the EU, Japan and the United States, President Viktor Yushchenko said Ukraine intended to call for international arbitration in the dispute.

Today, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov asked the European Union Tuesday to influence Ukraine to ensure full and uninterrupted gas transit from Russia to the EU countries. "We are requesting to influence Ukraine to return to the legal norms and ensure the uninterrupted transit of natural gas across its territory to the countries of the European Union in compliance with its international obligations," the message said.


”Old Europe’s” EU member states have alternative solutions to the Russian gas crisis

"Gaz de France could buy from Norway and Algeria, and there are also reserves," he told Europe 1 radio, adding that a proportion of GDF's customers were able to switch from gas to fuel if requested to do so.

German gas companies EON Ruhrgas and Wingas also announced unquantified supply disruptions, but Economy Minister Michael Glos said there was no cause for concern for the 17 million German households that use gas heating.

"Thank God, we have sufficient reserves and we have contracts with many other gas-supplying countries," Glos told WDR radio.

Europe's largest economy, Germany imports 35 percent of its gas from Russia. In London, Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks told BBC radio Britain was "not a heavy importer of gas from Russia" and was unlikely to suffer any disruption. Britain, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands produce their own gas, Sweden also uses North Sea production and Spain said it was unaffected by the dispute as it did not import Russian gas.

Greece, instead, is confronted with bigger problems as 79 percent of the country's gas was supplied by Russia. Managing Director of the Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) Asimakis Papageorgiou said that precautions were being taken. “We have secured an immediate increase in the amount of gas we receive from Algeria,” he said. Algeria supplies Greece with 20 percent of its gas.


Most of the Central and Eastern European countries depend on the Russian gas

It is worth mentioning that the states in Central and Eastern Europe region are mainly using Russian gas (that is transiting Ukraine): Slovakia - 100%; Bulgaria - 94%; Czech Republic - 73%; Hungary - 72%; Austria - 63%; Poland - 60%.

Russian gas imported by Romania covers about 40% of the country’s gas consumption, while home production would cover some 70% of the needs. Romania’s yearly gas consumption is about 18 billion cubic meters.

The yearly Gazprom supply for Germany is of 38 billion cubic meters, while France imports only 12 billion cubic meters.


China already increased gas price amid shortage fears

China has raised the price of natural gas in an apparent effort to ease demand as it tries to ensure fuel supplies for its energy-hungry economy.

Prices charged to factories and urban utility companies will rise by 5 percent to 10 percent, the Cabinet's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country's top economic planning agency, said Monday, Dec 26, 2005. Higher prices would be expected to slow growth in demand and spur domestic production of gas, which totaled about 45 billion cubic meters during the first 11 months of 2005.

The NDRC warned that natural gas demand will grow by 26 percent annually over the next five years, while production would rise by only 17 percent annually.

On Tuesday (Dec 27, 2005), the official China Securities Journal newspaper said China's natural gas import needs would likely reach 40-50 billion cubic meters per year by 2010 and twice that amount by 2020.

China has taken extraordinary measures in recent years to insure adequate supplies of energy for its booming economy — now the sixth largest in the world.

It signed a deal this year with the central Asian nation of Turkmenistan for gas imports and stepped up plans to build natural gas receiving plants along its booming east coast.

It has also sought greater access to Central Asian and Russian oil supplies. It opened an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan this month and is pressing Russian to speed up exports of Siberian oil via a planned pipeline to China.


Europe’s alternative gas sources

The most reliable alternative gas providers for Europe are Norway, Algeria, and possibly Nigeria.

Yesterday, anyhow, it became clear that Norway would have no possibilities to increase gas supplies to Europe if European consumers asked for that. Officials from major oil and gas companies of the country, Statoil and Hydro, also said they would not be able to increase gas supplies.

Norway is the biggest supplier of gas to Western Europe, daily exporting 270 million cubic meters of gas to Germany, France, Great Britain and Belgium. December 2005 saw an absolute record in the amount of Norwegian gas supplies to European consumers. Last year Norway sold about 81 billion cubic meters of gas.

Also, the trans-Mediterranean gas pipelines and LNG from Algeria and Libia are to be seen as viable solutions.

Nigeria is not to be forgotten. Recently, environmental groups estimate that Nigeria burns off almost half its 5 billion cubic feet of daily production because of a lack of gas-gathering networks. Edmund Daukoru, Nigeria's minister to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, said that associated gas flaring in Nigeria had risen in absolute levels over the last two years. Royal Dutch Shell, Nigeria's largest oil producer, says it saw its absolute levels of associated gas flaring increase to 728 million cubic feet daily in 2004 from 570 million in 2002.


Romania Report & Sources

Russia’s new global clout: Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute hits Europe, and also Romania (Jan 2, 2006)

(Initially published in http://www.romania-report.ro/ -- Jan 2, 2006)


Bucharest, Jan 2 – The gas price dispute between Russian and Ukraine resulted into a 25 point decrease in gas deliveries to Romania, even if Romania is paying the highest price in Europe to Gasprom (the Russian state-controlled gas exporter).

AP reports that gas supplies to much of Europe fell sharply Monday in the fallout of Moscow's pricing dispute with Ukraine while several nations urged energy-hungry industries to switch to oil. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned natural gas monopoly, began reducing supplies to Ukraine yesterday after Kiev refused to agree to a price hike from $50 dollars to $230 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres.

Despite the dispute, gas prices rose only marginally on Monday on world markets.

Still, with the 25-nation European Union counting on Russia for a quarter of its natural gas needs -- mostly through Ukraine -- concern rose that a prolonged standoff could spell severe problems. The German government urged Russia and Ukraine to compromise quickly in order to resolve their dispute over natural gas deliveries.

Russia took over the rotating presidency of the ‘Group of Eight’ most wealthy nations on Sunday, with President Vladimir Putin looking to convert his country's energy wealth into political influence.

East European countries -- many with a record of decades of energy dependency on Moscow established during a half century of domination by the former Soviet Union -- were the most hurt Monday.

Hungary reported gas supplies down by 40 percent after Russia's OAO Gazprom cut deliveries to neighboring Ukraine, which acts as a transit country for most of Russia's gas consignment to Europe. Russian gas amounts to about 80 percent of Hungary's needs.

MOL, the country's national wholesaler, said households would not be immediately threatened but joined providers in other nations in urging major industrial consumers to switch to backup oil systems. And MOL official Sandor Kantor said his company was cutting deliveries southward to Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia said it was receiving 50 percent less gas than normal. Aleksandar Kosadinovic, deputy director of Srbija Gas, the main distributor, said hospitals, schools and other vital consumers were being given priority.

Polish Economy Minister Piotr Wozniak said gas deliveries at the Polish-Ukrainian border had risen to about 65 percent of the daily norm, from a low of 50 percent on Sunday.

Apparently referring to fears of a complete collapse in deliveries from Russia, Economy Minister Pitor Wozniak said the country had stocks of “seven or eight days.”

In Austria, the OMV energy conglomerate said that natural gas imports from Russia via Ukraine were down by a third over usual levels. Slovak state oil company official Alexander Nemudrov told Russia's Gazprom-owned NTV television on Monday that it was receiving just 60 percent of the gas it needs to export further West.

A leading German importer of Russian gas, Wintershall AG, said it was seeing a noticeable reduction in the amount of gas arriving via Ukraine. And the E.On Ruhrgas natural gas distributor said deliveries to big businesses could be crimped by the dispute.

German industry can draw on stocks holding up to 75 days worth of gas as well as imports from other countries such as Norway and the Netherlands, economy ministry spokeswoman Sabine Maass said.

Italy and other nations with diversified gas sources were less affected. But oil and gas giant Eni Spa on Monday was measuring a «considerable reduction» in the pressure of the gas flow from Russia, Italian news agencies reported.

The crisis comes amid a harsh winter that has blanketed most of northern and central Italy in snow and already depleted the country's gas reserves.

«In the long term we cannot afford to give up» Russian natural gas, said Eni chief executive Paolo Scaroni.

Norway's Statoil ASA -- a major North Sea producer -- cautioned other European countries that it was not able to provide relief.

“We already are producing as much as we can, so there's not much we can do to meet a shortfall,” said spokesman Ola Morten Aanestad.

The gas dispute was the focus of a planned meeting of European energy officials set for Wednesday in Brussels. In announcing the meeting Friday, EU Energy Commisioner Andris Pielbalgs said the EU's Gas Coordination Group would deal “with all eventualities.”

Rep. of Moldova has not received Russian gas supplies for two days, said President Vladimir Voronin, saying that prices had inexplicably doubled, making it too expensive for the former Soviet republic to renew a contract with Russian company Gazprom.

Romania's deliveries from Russia were down by 25 percent, said officials, but unseasonably warm weather eased immediate concerns. Romania is importing from Gazprom some 40% of its overall needs (i.e. 3-3.5 billion cubic meters), at a price of $285 per 1,000 cubic metres. This price is by far the highest paid by a European state. Due to the circumstances, the Romanian Minister of Economy, Codrut Seres, sent a formal letter, to the Russian authorities, which reads that the Romanian counterpart requires that the gas deliveries to keep up with the provisions of the contract signed last November (the then contract sealed an increase of the Russian gas price from $252 to $285/’000 cubic metres).

As ‘Romania-Report’ previously said (on Dec 29, 2005), “Ukraine’s gas supplies were practically subsidised by Russia and the possible end of such subsidising would lead to its economical collapse eventually – not to mention what disastrous consequences a Russian-Ukrainian energy dispute would bring to the freshly ‘post-modern’ Europe.”*

Starting with 2006, as based on its energy resources, Russia seems to redefine its global role.


Romania Report & sources
___________________
*) See report below: The ‘Post-Modern State’ and the need for ‘Empire’

The ‘Post-Modern State’ and the need for ‘Empire’ (Dec 29, 2005)



By Mihai D. Popescu

(Initially published in http://www.romania-report.ro/ -- Dec 29, 2005)


At about seven centuries distance from Dante’s release of the world empire first utopian vision, a number of Western political analysts seem to seek ways of re-launching a similar project – needless to say that the outcome in the near future of this latter project could share the fate of the pre-Renaissance one.



Dante wrote his “De Monarchia” within the context of both a decreasing European power following the Crusades and an increasing tensions between the Catholic and secular power over the control of the ‘remains’ of the Holy Roman Empire.

It is now a common place that in the political discourse of the second half of the 20th century words such ‘empire’, ‘imperial’ and ‘imperialist’ were almost always used pejoratively. Even the rulers of systems which everyone else thought of as empires denied that the label applied to them. British publicists insisted that their global system was no longer an empire, but a ‘Commonwealth’. The French politicians and thinkers displayed a bizarre approach regarding their colonies, which really existed as such even under the veils of their generous idea of revolutionary Republic. As for the Soviet ones, they simply urged that by definition – stated by Lenin early in the century – their expansionism was not imperial, since only capitalist states could have been imperialistic.

Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism were perhaps the most globally (ubiquitous) ideologies, or slogans, of the post-WWII world. Since the fall of the Communist system, it followed almost inevitably that the critics of US foreign policy described it as either imperial or imperialist – this also because the EU chose not to refine any imperial ambitions until recently.

Lately, the idea of an American empire has become a central issue in the global political discourse – and it is employed from a far wider range of viewpoints. It is, naturally, still favoured by many negative critics of the phenomena concerned. But it is now used also by prominent liberal authors who seemingly intend the term in a neutral, essentially descriptive way, like Andrew J. Bacevich (1), Charles S. Maier (2), or Michael Ignatieff (3). Most strikingly, it is employed in tones of warm approval, not only by people like the India-born neoconservative American polemicist Dinesh D’Souza (4), but also by less didactic commentators like Robert Kagan (5), Sebastian Mallaby (6) and the senior British foreign service official Robert Cooper (7).

Due to the US-EU recent controversies, further on, we would rather approach the ‘Empire project’ within the framework of the ‘post-modern state’ and the ‘post-modern world order’, as the UK diplomat, Robert Cooper, had put it. We think that is more interesting to look closer to a European view on the subject also because such views are far more difficult to find in a printed format.

Thus, Robert Cooper, in his “Post-Modern State” (2002), says: “In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance of power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. 11 September showed us one of the implications of the change.”

“To understand the present, we must first understand the past, for the past is still with us. International order used to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside it, lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together – and it is the essence of empires that they are diverse – usually requires an authoritarian political style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability. Historically, empires have generally been static,” Cooper goes on.

Then, Cooper says that the European past solution for large communities’ evolution was the ‘small state’, but this on behalf of a continental political anarchy:

“In Europe, a middle way was found between the stasis of chaos and the stasis of empire, namely the small state. The small state succeeded in establishing sovereignty, but only within a geographically limited jurisdiction. Thus domestic order was purchased at the price of international anarchy. The competition between the small states of Europe was a source of progress, but the system was also constantly threatened by a relapse into chaos on one side and by the hegemony of a single power on the other. The solution to this was the balance of power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which became seen as the condition of liberty in Europe. Coalitions were successfully put together to thwart the hegemonic ambitions firstly of Spain, then of France, and finally of Germany.”

Cooper is right to underline that the revolutionary paradigm of the European power balance of ‘nation states’ eventually resulted into the bi-polar world order of the ‘Cold War Era’:

“But the balance of power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass society and democratic politics rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance of power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalist, moralist spirit of the late 20th century.”

“The second half of the 20th century saw not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the (20th) century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French, British and finally Soviet empires are now no more than a memory,” Cooper concludes, but forgets to say that, following the WWI, USA also emerged as the main world power – even if it did not have colonies as most of the ‘old empires’ did.

But, at the end of the day, why the ‘old’ empires were built for? Were they meant only to secure the rule of law and the Divine moral order all over mankind? Perhaps – however the main role of ‘old empires’ was also to provide a centre of power (i.e. ‘metropolis’) with full control over the human, natural resources and markets from large continental and/or trans-continental territories. And these imperialistic memories (turned into ideological clichés) are too fresh in the minds of the generations who survived and/or followed colonialism.

Cooper goes on by asserting that modern empires left us with two new types of state:

- First there are now states – often former colonies – where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist: a ‘pre-modern’ zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan).
- Second, there are the post-imperial, post-modern states that no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest.
- And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional “modern” states that behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d’état (one thinks of countries such as Russia, India, Pakistan and China).

Thus classifying the present day types of state, Cooper labels EU as a post-modern system which does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has apparently become a highly-developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs.

According to Robert Cooper the main characteristics of the ‘post-modern world’ are as follows:

- The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs

- Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance

- The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self enforced rules of behaviour

- The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites

- Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.


“The conception of an international criminal court is a striking example of the post-modern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the post-modern world, raison d’état and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war.”

“While such a system does deal with the problems that made the balance of power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state.

While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.”


“What is the origin of this basic change in the state system? The fundamental point is that ‘the world’s grown honest’ (Hamlet, Act II, scene ii, 235. See also line 236). A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and post-modern worlds.”

“Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the western powers.

If this is true, it follows that we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half-century of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that western European countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless, played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position.

NATO’s most valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is, a massive intra-Western confidence building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents a quality and stability of political relations never known before.

The EU is the most developed example of a post-modern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a trans-national than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.”

“European states are not the only members of the post-modern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a post-modern state; Japan is by inclination a post-modern state, but its location prevents it developing more fully in this direction.” [MDP: Japan is a 'post-modern state' close to the paradigm of 'post-modern dissolution' -- as the super-strong ‘Japanese traditions’ entered a dissolutive phase, while ‘capitalist libertinage’ produced dramatic social and cultural confusion.]


“The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do,” Cooper says but forgets that EU member states ‘openness’ might have resulted in a quite large extent from the ‘security umbrella’ provided by the US.”

“Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for a post-modern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.”

“Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz’s dictum, war is an instrument of policy, in the post-modern world it is a sign of policy failure."


Again Cooper is partially right – he may speak about the EU states, but not about the whole Europe. Since the Western Balkans conflicts were so poorly managed by the EU states, we wander why US had to bomb Serbia in order put an end to the war in Kosovo, while EU didn’t come with a non-violent solution instead. Likewise, EU still cannot provide ‘post-modern’ solutions for the Transdniester breakaway region of Rep. of Moldova. But maybe the Balkans and the Eastern Europe are not part of the would-be ‘post-modern’ Europe.”

As we go on and read more of Cooper’s analysis we are finally enlightened – we find out that the ‘post-modern world’ is supposed to have, on one hand, ‘post-modern rules’ for the inland problems and, on the other hand, the good-old ‘modern rules’ for the outland issues. Therefore, the British diplomat elaborates:

“But while the members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats. The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the post-modern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation. The challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards.

Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 19th century world of “every state for itself”. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state.”

“The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time.

Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state’s monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. Insofar as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The pre-modern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the post-modern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light.”

“How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.”

***

Cooper wrote this essay back in 2002, before the Afghan issue was to be settled eventually. Logically correct, the statements above may sound outrageous for the ears of liberal democrats. But there’s a crack in the china of this ‘defensive imperialism’ concept. The US-led Western coalition hit Afghanistan because of it was a safe haven for international terrorists and drugs. The then coalition acted in a resolute and united manner (at the beginning, at least). But not the same happened when it came to invade Iraq. The French, the Germans and the Russians strongly opposed the invasion. Why so? What was the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq? Cooper would say that, of course, Afghanistan was a chaotic ‘pre-modern’ system dominated by ‘non-state actors’ (i.e. the Mujahedins). Iraq, instead, was a ‘traditional modern state’ (like Pakistan, one might say by following Cooper’s standards). But, indeed, Saddam’s bloody dictatorial regime was it able to create a ‘traditional modern state’? The answer, in our opinion, is absolutely not – it only used the ‘likeness’ of such a system. The Stalinist-like Asian despotism intermingled with a kind of Muslim national-socialism resulted into a monster state (i.e. Saddam’s Iraq) which is beyond historical labels such as ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ or whatever other name some wishes to give it. Saddam invaded Iran and Kuwait, ordered mass killings of Kurds and Shiites at home, and eventually started to build huge cannons able to launch missiles against Israel. And was not Saddam himself the ’non-state actor’ to perform UN top level international corruption, by using the ‘oil-for-food’ programme? And, then, why operate a difference between a “chaotic pre-modern’ state run by terrorist Mujahedins and a well organised system which is meant to act as a ‘un-historic terror and/or slaughter mechanism’? In fact there was and there still is a significant difference between Afghanistan and Iraq -- the former is a poor country and the latter is outstandingly rich in oil.


Once these were being said, it is needless to remind here who and why was in favour or against the invasion of Iraq back in 2003. However, it seems that the main reason which triggered the invasion of Iraq is somehow more important and more intricate than ousting a bloody dictator and controlling some oil fields. In our opinion, the neocon ‘unilateralists’ and ‘militarists’ in Washington D.C. did not simply start a kind of a ‘crusade’ in order to feed a war economy but, on the contrary, they took responsibility for a difficult global process of change – to include, above all, a meticulous revolution in fuels and energy sector. And the possible side effects (at a global level) of such a change process are easily to be imagined. That is why staging a ‘new temporal empire’ should be required by this large scale transition. This ‘new empire’ should in no way be compared with the Dante’s pre-Renaissance utopian vision in ‘De Monarchia’ – even if today God’s guidance and spiritual strength are also needed in order to find the right way for securing the future wellbeing of mankind. Today, the religious and the moral common grounds are easier to rich (statement which seems contrary to the trivial perception) than the enlighten vision regarding the best possible evolution of our global techno-oecumene.

It is also clear that the ‘popular’ demand for imperialism has dried up long ago, but the conditions for the ‘empire’ are there (as Cooper says himself). By adopting another opinion than that we have pointed out here above, Cooper also introduces arguments in the support of the would-be European ‘new empire’ vision.

“Empire and imperialism are words that have become terms of abuse in the post-modern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need, for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the 19th century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia; one has since achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.”

“(…) yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well-governed export of stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth – all of these seem eminently desirable.”



“What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.”

“Post-modern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theory today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the post-modern world has also opened itself up).”

“The second form of post-modern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce.”

“It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to it – are over 100 NGOs.”

“One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime – which is what state collapse usually amounts to.”
“But Osama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.”

“The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no-one is imposing anything.” [MDP, 2008: Things have changed since Robert Cooper wrote his paper, back in 2002. "Someone" (i.e. Russia) is trying "to impose anything" in the Balkans, by using energy routes.]

“Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given – a whole mass of laws and regulations as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be described as a co-operative empire.”

“‘Commonwealth’ might indeed not be a bad name. The post-modern EU offers a vision of co-operative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A co-operative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.”

“That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the pre-modern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left,” Robert Cooper concludes.


Of course, the senior British diplomat outlined the vision of a ‘co-operative empire’ – a paradigm suitable for the Europe’s positioning rather as a continental-based ‘soft power’. In fact, this ‘weak’ Post-Modernist inspired paradigm inherits its ‘weaknesses’ not from some ideal conceptual architecture but from sheer reality – Europe, on one hand, does not have enough natural resources in order to act independently (as the Iraq invasion issue had shown) and, on the other hand, it does not have self-sufficient defence capabilities in order to secure its ‘outer’ borders. That is why the US forces were asked to intervene in the Western Balkans and now they are soon to be present in the Black Sea region (i.e. in Romania and, maybe, in Bulgaria).

We have chosen on purpose the Coopers study in order to get a glimpse of light on the different approaches regarding the would-be ‘post-modern empire’ – the ‘soft power’ European empire and the ‘hard power’ US-driven empire.

As for novelty of the ‘post-modern empire’ concept, one should remember that Arnold Toynbee (in his monumental ‘A Study of History’) indicated the year 1875 as the beginning of the ‘post-modern’ era – i.e. the starting point of the British power transition towards its ‘imperial stage’.

The label of ‘Post-Modernism’ (mainly related to culture) emerged in the mid 70ies of the last century, when some philosophers and theorists also tried to aggregate the supposed ‘post-modern paradigm’ (8). Some elements of this paradigm are also used by Cooper when defining the ‘post-modern state’. In our view (which we share with several others), at this very moment in history it would be more appropriate to speak about a ‘post-post-modern’ stage of civilisation.

Therefore, unfortunately, Cooper’s discourse displays more than some ‘small cracks in china’ – in our opinion, the apparently sharp analytical approach of present world types of states shows too much rhetoric effects and too many categorisation flaws. Thus, Cooper says there exists three types of states to date: the ‘pre-modern’ type, the ‘post-modern’ type (read EU), and the ‘(late) modern’ type. While the ‘post-modern state’ (that Cooper seems to favour) would promote “breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs”, on another hand, “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future” and ‘defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks.” Now, we are totally lost in ambiguity and/or vagueness. This because, following Cooper’s line on thinking, we cannot find out more ‘post-modernity’ in EU than in USA. According to Cooper’s description of the ‘post-modern world’, there are minimal differences between EU and USA. Moreover, by accepting that “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations” and that defence should be “embedded in international frameworks”, we do not understand in what particular point the USA approach contradicts Cooper’s idea of the ‘post-modern world’ and make him assert that “the USA is the more doubtful case” when it come to comply with stately ‘post-modernity’.

But even Robert Cooper – in a very sophisticated manner – could have been made use of that unique British reversed psychology and intended to transmit a clear message disguised into an ambiguous discourse. Namely that, no matter the controversies EU and USA, the Western world is tenting the paths towards a new kind of empire, even when using apparently different approaches.

This would be perfectly understandable, as long as EU is highly dependent of Russian gas and Trans-Caucasian oil while USA is not. Moreover, the recent problems EU encountered as regarding the some pressing budget issues show that the ‘raison d’état’ is far from vanishing within the ‘post-modern’ Union. Since Dante in his ‘De Monarchia’ repeatedly remembered us that God is always right, and since God has left the nations to last until the end of time, we cannot but assume (as good Christians) that the ‘nation states’ will not disappear, even if one calls them ‘post-modern’ states and even if ‘new empires’ are still to emerge.



Conclusion: How should a small state, such as Romania, deal with the ‘post-modern’ statehood dilemma?

It is of more interest for us (i.e. those living in a country which tries to become a ‘new democracy’, after it survived the Communist era) to understand how to deal with such complex geopolitical environment. For example, we shall evoke Romania’s case – this because he who writes these study is a Romanian. Romania recently became a NATO member and, besides, it enjoys a kind of privileged partnership with the US regarding some Eastern-European region’s strategic issues. Therefore, Romania joined NATO intervention in Afghanistan, joined the US-led ‘alliance of the willing’ in Iraq, and recently green-lighted the set-up of US military facilities on its territory. In August 2002 Romania went against its commitments to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by becoming the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States exempting American nationals from ICC jurisdiction.

On another hand, Romanian is undertaking the EU membership bid, with a formal accession deadline in 2007. In order to meet the EU standards, Romania implemented the ‘acquis communautaire’ and privatised the state-owned economy by selling out all its strategic assets (banking, utilities, oil industry, etc) to EU companies – those having the means and the know-how to bring the ‘post-modern’ management to the country. These macroeconomic and medium to long term projections form the main group of arguments presented by advocates of EU integration. Nevertheless there are key elements missing from the mainstream debate which would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the implications of EU integration. The immediate social costs of EU membership are usually only presented indirectly while EU officials are continuously showing red flags to Romania by asking the country to speed institutional and environmental reforms whose price is too high for country to perform amid the ongoing EU budget cuts. Moreover, EU politicians and media often criticise or at least tease Romania for its corruption and its close relationship with US. As about corruption, we think this is more a matter of ‘style’, as long as the EU leaders easily forget that some 10 years ago the EU was confronted with a $12 billion fraud in its agricultural programmes – to date, Romania is repeatedly accused of ‘high level’ corruption but the figures in question are in the range of tens of millions and the information on corruption is mainly extracted from the local media.

Located in the EU ‘limes’, Romania is currently paying the highest price for the Russian gas – as compared to any European country –, and no one in the ‘post-modern EU’ seems to notice. Moreover, while Romania struggled years in a row to be awarded the ‘functional market economy’ status, EU gives Ukraine the same status in one year (i.e. 2005), as Ukraine’s gas supplies were practically subsidised by Russia and the possible end of such subsidising would lead to its economical collapse eventually – not to mention what disastrous consequences a Russian-Ukrainian energy dispute would bring to the freshly ‘post-modern’ Europe.

What would Romania do under the circumstances? The country cannot give up the long awaited help of the Western huge geopolitical actors (i.e. America and Europe). USA is providing Romania with the security that EU is not able to come up with, though even if US managed to push Romania into NATO, it cannot force EU to generously boost the Romanian economy. Romania’s dilemma stands as a paradigmatic example of a small state complex relationship with the Western two-headed ‘post-modern’ emerging empire.


By Mihai D. Popescu - Dec 29, 2005


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1) Andrew J. Bacevich: The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005)

2) Charles S. Maier: Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Harvard University Press, 2005)

3) Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Gifford Lectures - Princeton University Press, 2004)

4) Dinesh D’Souza: What's So Great About America (Penguin Books; Reissue edition, 2003)

5) Robert Kagan: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Knopf; 1st edition, 2003)

6) Sebastian Mallaby: The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002)

7) Robert Cooper: The Post-Modern State (in ‘Re-Ordering the World’; The Foreign Policy Centre, London 2002)

8) Mihai D. Popescu: The Post-Modern Pragmatics (paper; proceedings of World Architecture Congress “Interarch-83”, Sofia 1983)

President Basescu visited Romanian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dec 25, 2006)

Romania's President Traian Basescu together with the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, while in Kabul.

(Initially published in www.romania-report.ro -- Dec 25, 2005)



Last week, President Traian Basescu visited Romanian military forces in Tallil (Iraq), Kandahar and Kabul (Afghanistan). He also paid a short visit in Tbilisi (Georgia).


When returning in Bucharest (Dec 22), President Basescu said the visit was intended to provide Romanian soldiers with the proof that the Presidency and the Government of Romania are paying their respects regarding the country’s military operations abroad.

Basescu said Romanian forces are able to perform both peace-keeping tasks and the background for economic development in the regions under their responsibility.

Basescu also said he had met Afghan President Hamid Karzai, while in Kabul, and Georgia’s President, Mihail Saakashvili, in Tibilisi. President Karzai was offered a T54 tank battalion -- soon to be replaced with NATO-compliant tanks by the Romanian army. Romanian President Traian Basescu made a surprise stop in Tbilisi on his way back from Afghanistan on December 22, the Georgian President’s press office reported. No other details of the visit are reported. President Basescu has already visited Georgia once this year to participate in the celebration of the 'Rose Revolution' on November 23.


Romania Report

Austrian ‘Erste Bank’ wins tender for Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR) (Dec 21, 2005)

HQ of the Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR)

(Initially published in http://www.romania-report.ro/ -- Dec 21, 2005)



Bucharest, Dec 20 – “And BCR goes to… Erste Bank,” Romanian FinMin Sebastian Vladescu said, on Tuesday, following the computer-judged bid on 62 percent of the Romanian Commercial Bank. Austria’s Erste Bank and Portugal’s Millennium bcp were competing to take over Romania’s biggest bank.


"We got the improved bids tonight. At the end of a process that was not easy at all, BCR goes to… Erste Bank. The price offered per share is 7.65 euros," Finance Minister Sebastian Vladescu said.

"The price offered for BCR shows Romania is part of the European Union. It is a European price for a European bank. The Romanian assets have a European value, a global value," he added.

The shares will be paid for in no more than ninety days from the signing of the contract, during which period the Romanian party has to meet a series of requirements, such as the enactment by Parliament of the Government Ordinance on the privatization contract.

Back on Nov 1st, Romania Report said that Erste Bank was set to make the priciest ever Eastern European banking acquisition, having offered about €3.2 bln for a majority stake in Romania's

Banca Commerciala Romana (BCR), as ‘Financial Times Deutschland’ reported that day by citing Romanian government sources.

Yesterday, Erste Bank eventually won one of the last major bank privatisations in Eastern Europe with a €3.75 bln ($4.49 billion) bid.

Erste will have to raise its equity by more than a fifth to fund buying the 61.88 percent stake in Banca Comerciala Romana (BCR), its biggest purchase ever, bolstering Erste's position as the second-largest bank in the former communist bloc.

The sale, which had attracted several European banks, shows Romania's determination to push ahead with economic reforms ahead of European Union entry which the Balkan country wants to achieve in 2007, Finance Minister Sebastian Vladescu said.

"This privatisation will strengthen Romania's banking system and will help it become a competitive sector," Vladescu told a news conference after announcing the winner. Romania needs to boost public administration transparency and curb corruption to join the EU quickly, and its partners in the sale, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank's investment arm IFC, have praised the tender as transparent.

Romania's government holds a 36.88 percent stake in BCR, which it is selling together with a 25 percent stake owned since 2003 by the EBRD and the IFC. Five Romanian investment firms own about 30 percent of BCR and the bank's employees hold 8 percent.

According to Reuters calculations, Romania will cash in 2.23 billion euros from the sale, the largest amount it has ever received from a privatisation. It has said the money may be used to upgrade its crumbling infrastructure and pension reform, but it has not said if it will channel the cash through the foreign exchange market.

Analysts had expected Erste to win the auction against its final contender, Portugal's largest private bank Millennium bcp, but had forecast a smaller 3.5 billion euro price tag. "This is more than I had expected," said Walid Khalfallah, banking analyst at Morgan Stanley.

"This stuff is very, very challenging." Erste said it will sell around 2.4 billion euros worth of new shares to fund the acquisition, more than 20 percent of its current market capitalisation. It will start working on a revamp of BCR immediately, aiming to double BCR's return on equity to 35 percent by 2009, something it has done well with past eastern European deals.

"Most people give (Chief Executive) Andreas (Treichl) the benefit of the doubt," said one analyst in London who refused to be named. "He's done a great job and has a good track record with his acquisitions. But you better hope nothing goes wrong with this one."

Erste will spend 100 million euros to improve BCR's branch network and infrastructure. It expects 90 million euros in extra costs next year, 100 million euros of additional risk provisions and a 100 million euro tax-related charge.

Erste's share price had slid by around 15 percent by mid-October from an all-time high of 47.75 euros on Sept. 12 as investors digested its plan to increase its share capital for BCR. They have largely pared those losses since. With the auction deadline looming, the bank's shares closed down 0.8 percent at 45.75 euros on Tuesday, valuing the bank at around 14 times next year's earnings -- close to the valuations of other banks with a presence in booming eastern Europe.


Romania Report