Former USSR : Whose Empire is it anyways?

(Initially published in www.romania-report.ro - Mar 21, 2005)


Neo-imperialism in the former Soviet countries is a term that sparks confusion more than controversy in Russia these days. Both Russia and the US are trying to call the shots in a battle for power that bears resemblance to the post WWII carving up of Germany into power bases of the allied forces.

The two countries are ill at ease with each other's presence in the former Soviet countries and US efforts to include Russian army bases in NATO based structures are not successful at all. Are the two (former) superpowers on a collision course?

Diplomacy Putin style even at the best of times is hardly an example of refined manipulation, but it might have peaked in ruthlessness now that more and more former Soviet states are freeing themselves from Moscow's stifling yoke and are growing stronger democracies. However active the proponents for democratic forces on the ground are in the former USSR, Russia has by far not given up on its spheres of influence.

There's no change in its immoral agenda in Chechnya. But also in less intensive situations particularly Georgia and Moldova, and to a lesser degree in Ukraine, it remains a mystery what the Russian stance exactly is. "The key challenge for Russian foreign policy in 2005 will be to develop a comprehensive ideology both for internal and external use, taking into consideration the various internal stakeholders - civil society, business, regions - and their interests", writes Liliana Proskuryakova at YaleGlobal Online.

Russia has come under increased scutiny from the international world. The international community since the beginning of this year has increased its calls to Russia to change its ways. Last week, EU leaders echoed US President Bush's comments that Russia was 'backsliding' on its democracy, during the Russian leader's visit to Paris in preparation of the May Summit between Russia and all the 25 countries in the EU. And last February, tensions between Moscow and Washington ahead of the Bratislava summit ran so high, it was expected that the meeting between the heads of state might even be called off.

The Bratislava summit went smooth however, but this was largely due to a seriously toned down agenda. It will be interesting to see how Putin will go about mending his international reputation as Russia's democratic leader while simultaneously holding on to his strategy of extending Russian influence at a time that the US is also holding onto its strategy in those countries where Russians could not afford to increase their efforts. Russia largely ows its rapidly decreasing influence to its highly centralized, old fashioned system of foreign policy decision-making. For the Russian psyche it is near inconceivable to ever give up the exclusive access it has to many of its previous satellite states.

Putin is believed to have a considerable agenda for Russian influence, and his vague but quite extreme views are enjoying strong support although the Russian population is at times even more vehemently anti Western than Putin himself. Putin's home situation doesn't make things any less complicated. What's been dubbed the 'nationalist revanchist agenda' is a strong force in a number of home grown parties in Russia aiming to reclaim previous territories and preservation of the Russian heritage. Putin is said to personally favor some of the Motherland Party's manifesto, but he is believed to not let this impact on the U.S.-Russian relations.

A worsening of bilateral ties with the US would most likely be seen in Russia as President Putin's personal failure. Yet there is support for neo imperialism from most political camps. Pro-Russia sentiment in the former Soviet countries themselves is also not to be underestimated. Moscow's push for instituting Russian as Ukraine's second official language enjoys some support of the Ukrainian population. The situation in Georgia highlights just how much both the US and Russia are on each other's lip in a country that's subject to internal strife.

Russia has given no sign of retreating its 2,000 armed forces from Georgian soil, as it was supposed to have completed by 2001 under a deal Tblisi and Moscow signed through Turkish mediation in 1999. The US, by means of its war on terror, stationed its troops in the country without waiting for Russian endorsement. Russia is especially worried that the US influence in its neigbouring countries -which is at unprecedented levels- will lead to the establishment of a long-term U.S. presence.

News reports in local Georgian media indicated that the US is there to stay. In the short term, Russia's leader is faced with a number of issues that will indicate what course of action he is likely to take in either supporting or obscuring democratic forces throughout the region. Ukraine no doubt will ask a lot of his time if he wants to steer this country away from the decidedly pro Western path it has chosen, with some staunch US backing that led to the annullment of the elections previously and which enraged Moscow. In the wake of its last elections this country is seen by some as a greater example of democracy than Russia is likely to be and Mr Putin's meddling in the elections have been severely criticised.

Ukraine, a strongly pro-Russian country for the past decade, voted in favor of a non-Moscow backed candidate during elections last December. Ukraine's new leader, Viktor Yushchenko, simply equals the country's wish to become part of NATO and the EU and ditch its membership of the Kremlin-promoted common economic space, which would unite the Russian economy with that of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine's new leader's first victory over Moscow in asserting its Westward leaning policies was achieved last week, when Mr Yushchenko agreed with Mr Putin to go ahead with his plans to invite European countries to develop a new gas pipeline from Ukraine to Europe.

Putin was forced to support Western European participation in the oil pipeline that he had wanted to build in a Russian-Ukranian partnership only. Although observers say that the country's relations with Russia are not going to be drastically changed, some of the perceptible changes that occurred in Ukraine might influence the Russian agenda elsewhere. In the last few months, it's become clear that Ukraine's cultural disunity has become a strength in the country's democratisation process. The former opposition which now rules has become not only a ligitimate party, but more importantly a recognisable party, members of which don't have to hide their political inclination anymore.

Research by the Razumkov Center in Kiev highlights that especially people living in the opposed Russia dominated east and the more western parts bordering Poland favor a multiparty political system strongest. This must have been a smack in the face for Mr Putin. Incidentally, the same researchers also found that 81% of the population is still vehemently in favor of total independence, which means that even pro Moscow voters must be in two minds on the issue of Russian domination.

Ukraine drove home the message that grassroot democracy can become a force that needs to be reckoned with. A journalist describing the elections drew attention to this; "One big difference sets Sunday's presidential election in Ukraine apart from others held over the past 10 years to pick national leaders in the 12 countries of the former Soviet Union: Sunday's winner is not known in advance. A first in post-Soviet politics.

Ukraine is the last in a serious of former Soviet states - after Georgia and Moldova - that chose an anti Moscow regime. Even when the U.S.-led security assistance efforts from Ukraine to Uzbekistan took place as a backup to the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan have strained the Russian relations with the US.The pro European winds of change are sweeping across more countries too.

Moldova recently turned out a steady vote for its leader who abandoned Moscow backed rulings in favor of a more European leaning. Moldova ruled by a regime that is not altogether loyal to Putin and where a separatist movement throws a spanner in the works domestically in the contested strip of land Transdniestria, which wants independence from Moldova and which is believed to be a stronghold for drug trafficking, terrorism and arms dealing. Russia still has 1,300 troops stationed in Transdniestria even though it was supposed to withdraw by 2001 under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The country's contested Transdniestria strip of land borders with Ukraine and this country is interested in collaborating with the United States, the European Union, Romania and Russia to control the borders with the Transdniestrian region.

The US has kickstarted its Central Asian troop deployment in some of the countries the very day the Soviet Union broke up, by linking humanitarian relief assistance with economic and political reform. Claiming that Russia was unable to assume the full burden of being the 'security manager' in the region, the US more or less stepped in as and where it saw fit and built its army camps concurrently.

The US claims its efforts are aimed also to include Russia in cooperative activities that the United States undertook bilaterally and multilaterally with its neighbors. However the Russians in most cases don't feel the need for this. It has around 2,000 Russian servicemen at seven military bases in Georgia.

The US supports Georgia's push for independence, and has even offered to put funds toward Russia's USD 500 million withdrawal fee, but the negotiations are simply not going anywhere. Russia wants a timeframe of around 10 years to withdraw its troops and Georgia is pushing for three years.

Agreement should have long been reached under the ruling of a Turkey-mediated deal that Russia and Georgia signed in 1999, which stipulates that the details on Russian troop withdrawal would have been agreed on before 2001. Two of the seven Russian bases -those in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (in the southern Georgian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti)- are believed to be especially troublesome because they are instrumental in the internal domestic strife. The base in Batumi, (the capital of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic) is a known powerbase for strongman Aslan Abashidze, who is said to seriously undermine the country's new leadership. Parts of the population are vehemently opposed to Russian withdrawal because it will increase unemployment. Underlining the extent to which Georgia's internal difficulties further complicate the problem are the problems with the Gudauta military base in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia.

Russia claims that it has already pulled out troops and weaponry from Gudauta, while Georgians demand international monitoring of the base, as the region is out of Georgia's control. It is suspected that the three Russia's bases are used for arms dealing.

Americans are pushing for the option to seek to internationalize Russia's presence in Georgia and Moldova by running them into the NATO program of Partnership for Peace (PFP). This would make the troops' presence legitimate and also stave off dangers of any small arms trading. International countries would have access to Russian facilities on the ground in the countries and Georgia and Moldova would benefit from a reduced threat that Russia's presence might lead to occupation and subversion.

Russia's policy to hold off dealing with the US and the West in effecting more transparent international structures might also be part of an effort of buying time as Russian businesses are beginning to expand into the neighboring countries. Russian-owned companies are active in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

Russian business ventures have elicited concerns about strategic penetration of the neighboring states. There are repeated accusations of intransparency of the transactions. Russians are often part of major industrial or infrastructure projects by dint of a series of obscure merits and nepotism is rife. Evidence of Russian governmental interference in shady deals is hardly ever found and corruption in host countries might also sometimes be part of such shady ploddings too.


Angelique van Engelen is a former Middle East correspondent and currently runs a writing agency http://www.contentclix.com