By Mihai D. Popescu
(Initially published in http://www.romania-report.ro/ -- Dec 29, 2005)
At about seven centuries distance from Dante’s release of the world empire first utopian vision, a number of Western political analysts seem to seek ways of re-launching a similar project – needless to say that the outcome in the near future of this latter project could share the fate of the pre-Renaissance one.
Dante wrote his “De Monarchia” within the context of both a decreasing European power following the Crusades and an increasing tensions between the Catholic and secular power over the control of the ‘remains’ of the Holy Roman Empire.
It is now a common place that in the political discourse of the second half of the 20th century words such ‘empire’, ‘imperial’ and ‘imperialist’ were almost always used pejoratively. Even the rulers of systems which everyone else thought of as empires denied that the label applied to them. British publicists insisted that their global system was no longer an empire, but a ‘Commonwealth’. The French politicians and thinkers displayed a bizarre approach regarding their colonies, which really existed as such even under the veils of their generous idea of revolutionary Republic. As for the Soviet ones, they simply urged that by definition – stated by Lenin early in the century – their expansionism was not imperial, since only capitalist states could have been imperialistic.
Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism were perhaps the most globally (ubiquitous) ideologies, or slogans, of the post-WWII world. Since the fall of the Communist system, it followed almost inevitably that the critics of US foreign policy described it as either imperial or imperialist – this also because the EU chose not to refine any imperial ambitions until recently.
Lately, the idea of an American empire has become a central issue in the global political discourse – and it is employed from a far wider range of viewpoints. It is, naturally, still favoured by many negative critics of the phenomena concerned. But it is now used also by prominent liberal authors who seemingly intend the term in a neutral, essentially descriptive way, like Andrew J. Bacevich (1), Charles S. Maier (2), or Michael Ignatieff (3). Most strikingly, it is employed in tones of warm approval, not only by people like the India-born neoconservative American polemicist Dinesh D’Souza (4), but also by less didactic commentators like Robert Kagan (5), Sebastian Mallaby (6) and the senior British foreign service official Robert Cooper (7).
Due to the US-EU recent controversies, further on, we would rather approach the ‘Empire project’ within the framework of the ‘post-modern state’ and the ‘post-modern world order’, as the UK diplomat, Robert Cooper, had put it. We think that is more interesting to look closer to a European view on the subject also because such views are far more difficult to find in a printed format.
Thus, Robert Cooper, in his “Post-Modern State” (2002), says: “In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance of power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. 11 September showed us one of the implications of the change.”
“To understand the present, we must first understand the past, for the past is still with us. International order used to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside it, lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together – and it is the essence of empires that they are diverse – usually requires an authoritarian political style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability. Historically, empires have generally been static,” Cooper goes on.
Then, Cooper says that the European past solution for large communities’ evolution was the ‘small state’, but this on behalf of a continental political anarchy:
“In Europe, a middle way was found between the stasis of chaos and the stasis of empire, namely the small state. The small state succeeded in establishing sovereignty, but only within a geographically limited jurisdiction. Thus domestic order was purchased at the price of international anarchy. The competition between the small states of Europe was a source of progress, but the system was also constantly threatened by a relapse into chaos on one side and by the hegemony of a single power on the other. The solution to this was the balance of power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which became seen as the condition of liberty in Europe. Coalitions were successfully put together to thwart the hegemonic ambitions firstly of Spain, then of France, and finally of Germany.”
Cooper is right to underline that the revolutionary paradigm of the European power balance of ‘nation states’ eventually resulted into the bi-polar world order of the ‘Cold War Era’:
“But the balance of power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass society and democratic politics rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance of power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalist, moralist spirit of the late 20th century.”
“The second half of the 20th century saw not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the (20th) century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French, British and finally Soviet empires are now no more than a memory,” Cooper concludes, but forgets to say that, following the WWI, USA also emerged as the main world power – even if it did not have colonies as most of the ‘old empires’ did.
But, at the end of the day, why the ‘old’ empires were built for? Were they meant only to secure the rule of law and the Divine moral order all over mankind? Perhaps – however the main role of ‘old empires’ was also to provide a centre of power (i.e. ‘metropolis’) with full control over the human, natural resources and markets from large continental and/or trans-continental territories. And these imperialistic memories (turned into ideological clichés) are too fresh in the minds of the generations who survived and/or followed colonialism.
Cooper goes on by asserting that modern empires left us with two new types of state:
- First there are now states – often former colonies – where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist: a ‘pre-modern’ zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan).
- Second, there are the post-imperial, post-modern states that no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest.
- And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional “modern” states that behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d’état (one thinks of countries such as Russia, India, Pakistan and China).
Thus classifying the present day types of state, Cooper labels EU as a post-modern system which does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has apparently become a highly-developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs.
According to Robert Cooper the main characteristics of the ‘post-modern world’ are as follows:
- The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs
- Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance
- The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self enforced rules of behaviour
- The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites
- Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.
“The conception of an international criminal court is a striking example of the post-modern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the post-modern world, raison d’état and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war.”
“While such a system does deal with the problems that made the balance of power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state.
While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.”
“What is the origin of this basic change in the state system? The fundamental point is that ‘the world’s grown honest’ (Hamlet, Act II, scene ii, 235. See also line 236). A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and post-modern worlds.”
“Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the western powers.
If this is true, it follows that we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half-century of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that western European countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless, played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position.
NATO’s most valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is, a massive intra-Western confidence building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents a quality and stability of political relations never known before.
The EU is the most developed example of a post-modern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a trans-national than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.”
“European states are not the only members of the post-modern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a post-modern state; Japan is by inclination a post-modern state, but its location prevents it developing more fully in this direction.” [MDP: Japan is a 'post-modern state' close to the paradigm of 'post-modern dissolution' -- as the super-strong ‘Japanese traditions’ entered a dissolutive phase, while ‘capitalist libertinage’ produced dramatic social and cultural confusion.]
“The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do,” Cooper says but forgets that EU member states ‘openness’ might have resulted in a quite large extent from the ‘security umbrella’ provided by the US.”
“Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for a post-modern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.”
“Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz’s dictum, war is an instrument of policy, in the post-modern world it is a sign of policy failure."
Again Cooper is partially right – he may speak about the EU states, but not about the whole Europe. Since the Western Balkans conflicts were so poorly managed by the EU states, we wander why US had to bomb Serbia in order put an end to the war in Kosovo, while EU didn’t come with a non-violent solution instead. Likewise, EU still cannot provide ‘post-modern’ solutions for the Transdniester breakaway region of Rep. of Moldova. But maybe the Balkans and the Eastern Europe are not part of the would-be ‘post-modern’ Europe.”
As we go on and read more of Cooper’s analysis we are finally enlightened – we find out that the ‘post-modern world’ is supposed to have, on one hand, ‘post-modern rules’ for the inland problems and, on the other hand, the good-old ‘modern rules’ for the outland issues. Therefore, the British diplomat elaborates:
“But while the members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats. The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the post-modern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation. The challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards.
Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 19th century world of “every state for itself”. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state.”
“The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time.
Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state’s monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. Insofar as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.
The pre-modern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the post-modern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light.”
“How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.”
***
Cooper wrote this essay back in 2002, before the Afghan issue was to be settled eventually. Logically correct, the statements above may sound outrageous for the ears of liberal democrats. But there’s a crack in the china of this ‘defensive imperialism’ concept. The US-led Western coalition hit Afghanistan because of it was a safe haven for international terrorists and drugs. The then coalition acted in a resolute and united manner (at the beginning, at least). But not the same happened when it came to invade Iraq. The French, the Germans and the Russians strongly opposed the invasion. Why so? What was the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq? Cooper would say that, of course, Afghanistan was a chaotic ‘pre-modern’ system dominated by ‘non-state actors’ (i.e. the Mujahedins). Iraq, instead, was a ‘traditional modern state’ (like Pakistan, one might say by following Cooper’s standards). But, indeed, Saddam’s bloody dictatorial regime was it able to create a ‘traditional modern state’? The answer, in our opinion, is absolutely not – it only used the ‘likeness’ of such a system. The Stalinist-like Asian despotism intermingled with a kind of Muslim national-socialism resulted into a monster state (i.e. Saddam’s Iraq) which is beyond historical labels such as ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ or whatever other name some wishes to give it. Saddam invaded Iran and Kuwait, ordered mass killings of Kurds and Shiites at home, and eventually started to build huge cannons able to launch missiles against Israel. And was not Saddam himself the ’non-state actor’ to perform UN top level international corruption, by using the ‘oil-for-food’ programme? And, then, why operate a difference between a “chaotic pre-modern’ state run by terrorist Mujahedins and a well organised system which is meant to act as a ‘un-historic terror and/or slaughter mechanism’? In fact there was and there still is a significant difference between Afghanistan and Iraq -- the former is a poor country and the latter is outstandingly rich in oil.
As we go on and read more of Cooper’s analysis we are finally enlightened – we find out that the ‘post-modern world’ is supposed to have, on one hand, ‘post-modern rules’ for the inland problems and, on the other hand, the good-old ‘modern rules’ for the outland issues. Therefore, the British diplomat elaborates:
“But while the members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats. The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the post-modern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation. The challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards.
Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 19th century world of “every state for itself”. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state.”
“The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time.
Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state’s monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. Insofar as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.
The pre-modern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the post-modern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light.”
“How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.”
***
Cooper wrote this essay back in 2002, before the Afghan issue was to be settled eventually. Logically correct, the statements above may sound outrageous for the ears of liberal democrats. But there’s a crack in the china of this ‘defensive imperialism’ concept. The US-led Western coalition hit Afghanistan because of it was a safe haven for international terrorists and drugs. The then coalition acted in a resolute and united manner (at the beginning, at least). But not the same happened when it came to invade Iraq. The French, the Germans and the Russians strongly opposed the invasion. Why so? What was the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq? Cooper would say that, of course, Afghanistan was a chaotic ‘pre-modern’ system dominated by ‘non-state actors’ (i.e. the Mujahedins). Iraq, instead, was a ‘traditional modern state’ (like Pakistan, one might say by following Cooper’s standards). But, indeed, Saddam’s bloody dictatorial regime was it able to create a ‘traditional modern state’? The answer, in our opinion, is absolutely not – it only used the ‘likeness’ of such a system. The Stalinist-like Asian despotism intermingled with a kind of Muslim national-socialism resulted into a monster state (i.e. Saddam’s Iraq) which is beyond historical labels such as ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ or whatever other name some wishes to give it. Saddam invaded Iran and Kuwait, ordered mass killings of Kurds and Shiites at home, and eventually started to build huge cannons able to launch missiles against Israel. And was not Saddam himself the ’non-state actor’ to perform UN top level international corruption, by using the ‘oil-for-food’ programme? And, then, why operate a difference between a “chaotic pre-modern’ state run by terrorist Mujahedins and a well organised system which is meant to act as a ‘un-historic terror and/or slaughter mechanism’? In fact there was and there still is a significant difference between Afghanistan and Iraq -- the former is a poor country and the latter is outstandingly rich in oil.
Once these were being said, it is needless to remind here who and why was in favour or against the invasion of Iraq back in 2003. However, it seems that the main reason which triggered the invasion of Iraq is somehow more important and more intricate than ousting a bloody dictator and controlling some oil fields. In our opinion, the neocon ‘unilateralists’ and ‘militarists’ in Washington D.C. did not simply start a kind of a ‘crusade’ in order to feed a war economy but, on the contrary, they took responsibility for a difficult global process of change – to include, above all, a meticulous revolution in fuels and energy sector. And the possible side effects (at a global level) of such a change process are easily to be imagined. That is why staging a ‘new temporal empire’ should be required by this large scale transition. This ‘new empire’ should in no way be compared with the Dante’s pre-Renaissance utopian vision in ‘De Monarchia’ – even if today God’s guidance and spiritual strength are also needed in order to find the right way for securing the future wellbeing of mankind. Today, the religious and the moral common grounds are easier to rich (statement which seems contrary to the trivial perception) than the enlighten vision regarding the best possible evolution of our global techno-oecumene.
It is also clear that the ‘popular’ demand for imperialism has dried up long ago, but the conditions for the ‘empire’ are there (as Cooper says himself). By adopting another opinion than that we have pointed out here above, Cooper also introduces arguments in the support of the would-be European ‘new empire’ vision.
“Empire and imperialism are words that have become terms of abuse in the post-modern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need, for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the 19th century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia; one has since achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.”
“(…) yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well-governed export of stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth – all of these seem eminently desirable.”
“What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.”
“Post-modern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theory today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the post-modern world has also opened itself up).”
“The second form of post-modern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce.”
“It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to it – are over 100 NGOs.”
“One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime – which is what state collapse usually amounts to.”
“But Osama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.”
“The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no-one is imposing anything.” [MDP, 2008: Things have changed since Robert Cooper wrote his paper, back in 2002. "Someone" (i.e. Russia) is trying "to impose anything" in the Balkans, by using energy routes.]
“Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given – a whole mass of laws and regulations as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be described as a co-operative empire.”
“‘Commonwealth’ might indeed not be a bad name. The post-modern EU offers a vision of co-operative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A co-operative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.”
“That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the pre-modern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left,” Robert Cooper concludes.
Of course, the senior British diplomat outlined the vision of a ‘co-operative empire’ – a paradigm suitable for the Europe’s positioning rather as a continental-based ‘soft power’. In fact, this ‘weak’ Post-Modernist inspired paradigm inherits its ‘weaknesses’ not from some ideal conceptual architecture but from sheer reality – Europe, on one hand, does not have enough natural resources in order to act independently (as the Iraq invasion issue had shown) and, on the other hand, it does not have self-sufficient defence capabilities in order to secure its ‘outer’ borders. That is why the US forces were asked to intervene in the Western Balkans and now they are soon to be present in the Black Sea region (i.e. in Romania and, maybe, in Bulgaria).
We have chosen on purpose the Coopers study in order to get a glimpse of light on the different approaches regarding the would-be ‘post-modern empire’ – the ‘soft power’ European empire and the ‘hard power’ US-driven empire.
As for novelty of the ‘post-modern empire’ concept, one should remember that Arnold Toynbee (in his monumental ‘A Study of History’) indicated the year 1875 as the beginning of the ‘post-modern’ era – i.e. the starting point of the British power transition towards its ‘imperial stage’.
The label of ‘Post-Modernism’ (mainly related to culture) emerged in the mid 70ies of the last century, when some philosophers and theorists also tried to aggregate the supposed ‘post-modern paradigm’ (8). Some elements of this paradigm are also used by Cooper when defining the ‘post-modern state’. In our view (which we share with several others), at this very moment in history it would be more appropriate to speak about a ‘post-post-modern’ stage of civilisation.
Therefore, unfortunately, Cooper’s discourse displays more than some ‘small cracks in china’ – in our opinion, the apparently sharp analytical approach of present world types of states shows too much rhetoric effects and too many categorisation flaws. Thus, Cooper says there exists three types of states to date: the ‘pre-modern’ type, the ‘post-modern’ type (read EU), and the ‘(late) modern’ type. While the ‘post-modern state’ (that Cooper seems to favour) would promote “breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs”, on another hand, “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future” and ‘defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks.” Now, we are totally lost in ambiguity and/or vagueness. This because, following Cooper’s line on thinking, we cannot find out more ‘post-modernity’ in EU than in USA. According to Cooper’s description of the ‘post-modern world’, there are minimal differences between EU and USA. Moreover, by accepting that “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations” and that defence should be “embedded in international frameworks”, we do not understand in what particular point the USA approach contradicts Cooper’s idea of the ‘post-modern world’ and make him assert that “the USA is the more doubtful case” when it come to comply with stately ‘post-modernity’.
But even Robert Cooper – in a very sophisticated manner – could have been made use of that unique British reversed psychology and intended to transmit a clear message disguised into an ambiguous discourse. Namely that, no matter the controversies EU and USA, the Western world is tenting the paths towards a new kind of empire, even when using apparently different approaches.
This would be perfectly understandable, as long as EU is highly dependent of Russian gas and Trans-Caucasian oil while USA is not. Moreover, the recent problems EU encountered as regarding the some pressing budget issues show that the ‘raison d’état’ is far from vanishing within the ‘post-modern’ Union. Since Dante in his ‘De Monarchia’ repeatedly remembered us that God is always right, and since God has left the nations to last until the end of time, we cannot but assume (as good Christians) that the ‘nation states’ will not disappear, even if one calls them ‘post-modern’ states and even if ‘new empires’ are still to emerge.
Conclusion: How should a small state, such as Romania, deal with the ‘post-modern’ statehood dilemma?
It is of more interest for us (i.e. those living in a country which tries to become a ‘new democracy’, after it survived the Communist era) to understand how to deal with such complex geopolitical environment. For example, we shall evoke Romania’s case – this because he who writes these study is a Romanian. Romania recently became a NATO member and, besides, it enjoys a kind of privileged partnership with the US regarding some Eastern-European region’s strategic issues. Therefore, Romania joined NATO intervention in Afghanistan, joined the US-led ‘alliance of the willing’ in Iraq, and recently green-lighted the set-up of US military facilities on its territory. In August 2002 Romania went against its commitments to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by becoming the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States exempting American nationals from ICC jurisdiction.
On another hand, Romanian is undertaking the EU membership bid, with a formal accession deadline in 2007. In order to meet the EU standards, Romania implemented the ‘acquis communautaire’ and privatised the state-owned economy by selling out all its strategic assets (banking, utilities, oil industry, etc) to EU companies – those having the means and the know-how to bring the ‘post-modern’ management to the country. These macroeconomic and medium to long term projections form the main group of arguments presented by advocates of EU integration. Nevertheless there are key elements missing from the mainstream debate which would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the implications of EU integration. The immediate social costs of EU membership are usually only presented indirectly while EU officials are continuously showing red flags to Romania by asking the country to speed institutional and environmental reforms whose price is too high for country to perform amid the ongoing EU budget cuts. Moreover, EU politicians and media often criticise or at least tease Romania for its corruption and its close relationship with US. As about corruption, we think this is more a matter of ‘style’, as long as the EU leaders easily forget that some 10 years ago the EU was confronted with a $12 billion fraud in its agricultural programmes – to date, Romania is repeatedly accused of ‘high level’ corruption but the figures in question are in the range of tens of millions and the information on corruption is mainly extracted from the local media.
Located in the EU ‘limes’, Romania is currently paying the highest price for the Russian gas – as compared to any European country –, and no one in the ‘post-modern EU’ seems to notice. Moreover, while Romania struggled years in a row to be awarded the ‘functional market economy’ status, EU gives Ukraine the same status in one year (i.e. 2005), as Ukraine’s gas supplies were practically subsidised by Russia and the possible end of such subsidising would lead to its economical collapse eventually – not to mention what disastrous consequences a Russian-Ukrainian energy dispute would bring to the freshly ‘post-modern’ Europe.
What would Romania do under the circumstances? The country cannot give up the long awaited help of the Western huge geopolitical actors (i.e. America and Europe). USA is providing Romania with the security that EU is not able to come up with, though even if US managed to push Romania into NATO, it cannot force EU to generously boost the Romanian economy. Romania’s dilemma stands as a paradigmatic example of a small state complex relationship with the Western two-headed ‘post-modern’ emerging empire.
By Mihai D. Popescu - Dec 29, 2005
_________________
1) Andrew J. Bacevich: The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005)
2) Charles S. Maier: Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Harvard University Press, 2005)
3) Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Gifford Lectures - Princeton University Press, 2004)
4) Dinesh D’Souza: What's So Great About America (Penguin Books; Reissue edition, 2003)
5) Robert Kagan: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Knopf; 1st edition, 2003)
6) Sebastian Mallaby: The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002)
7) Robert Cooper: The Post-Modern State (in ‘Re-Ordering the World’; The Foreign Policy Centre, London 2002)
8) Mihai D. Popescu: The Post-Modern Pragmatics (paper; proceedings of World Architecture Congress “Interarch-83”, Sofia 1983)
It is also clear that the ‘popular’ demand for imperialism has dried up long ago, but the conditions for the ‘empire’ are there (as Cooper says himself). By adopting another opinion than that we have pointed out here above, Cooper also introduces arguments in the support of the would-be European ‘new empire’ vision.
“Empire and imperialism are words that have become terms of abuse in the post-modern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need, for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the 19th century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia; one has since achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.”
“(…) yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well-governed export of stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth – all of these seem eminently desirable.”
“What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.”
“Post-modern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theory today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the post-modern world has also opened itself up).”
“The second form of post-modern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce.”
“It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to it – are over 100 NGOs.”
“One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime – which is what state collapse usually amounts to.”
“But Osama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.”
“The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no-one is imposing anything.” [MDP, 2008: Things have changed since Robert Cooper wrote his paper, back in 2002. "Someone" (i.e. Russia) is trying "to impose anything" in the Balkans, by using energy routes.]
“Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given – a whole mass of laws and regulations as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be described as a co-operative empire.”
“‘Commonwealth’ might indeed not be a bad name. The post-modern EU offers a vision of co-operative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A co-operative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.”
“That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the pre-modern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left,” Robert Cooper concludes.
Of course, the senior British diplomat outlined the vision of a ‘co-operative empire’ – a paradigm suitable for the Europe’s positioning rather as a continental-based ‘soft power’. In fact, this ‘weak’ Post-Modernist inspired paradigm inherits its ‘weaknesses’ not from some ideal conceptual architecture but from sheer reality – Europe, on one hand, does not have enough natural resources in order to act independently (as the Iraq invasion issue had shown) and, on the other hand, it does not have self-sufficient defence capabilities in order to secure its ‘outer’ borders. That is why the US forces were asked to intervene in the Western Balkans and now they are soon to be present in the Black Sea region (i.e. in Romania and, maybe, in Bulgaria).
We have chosen on purpose the Coopers study in order to get a glimpse of light on the different approaches regarding the would-be ‘post-modern empire’ – the ‘soft power’ European empire and the ‘hard power’ US-driven empire.
As for novelty of the ‘post-modern empire’ concept, one should remember that Arnold Toynbee (in his monumental ‘A Study of History’) indicated the year 1875 as the beginning of the ‘post-modern’ era – i.e. the starting point of the British power transition towards its ‘imperial stage’.
The label of ‘Post-Modernism’ (mainly related to culture) emerged in the mid 70ies of the last century, when some philosophers and theorists also tried to aggregate the supposed ‘post-modern paradigm’ (8). Some elements of this paradigm are also used by Cooper when defining the ‘post-modern state’. In our view (which we share with several others), at this very moment in history it would be more appropriate to speak about a ‘post-post-modern’ stage of civilisation.
Therefore, unfortunately, Cooper’s discourse displays more than some ‘small cracks in china’ – in our opinion, the apparently sharp analytical approach of present world types of states shows too much rhetoric effects and too many categorisation flaws. Thus, Cooper says there exists three types of states to date: the ‘pre-modern’ type, the ‘post-modern’ type (read EU), and the ‘(late) modern’ type. While the ‘post-modern state’ (that Cooper seems to favour) would promote “breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs”, on another hand, “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future” and ‘defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks.” Now, we are totally lost in ambiguity and/or vagueness. This because, following Cooper’s line on thinking, we cannot find out more ‘post-modernity’ in EU than in USA. According to Cooper’s description of the ‘post-modern world’, there are minimal differences between EU and USA. Moreover, by accepting that “traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations” and that defence should be “embedded in international frameworks”, we do not understand in what particular point the USA approach contradicts Cooper’s idea of the ‘post-modern world’ and make him assert that “the USA is the more doubtful case” when it come to comply with stately ‘post-modernity’.
But even Robert Cooper – in a very sophisticated manner – could have been made use of that unique British reversed psychology and intended to transmit a clear message disguised into an ambiguous discourse. Namely that, no matter the controversies EU and USA, the Western world is tenting the paths towards a new kind of empire, even when using apparently different approaches.
This would be perfectly understandable, as long as EU is highly dependent of Russian gas and Trans-Caucasian oil while USA is not. Moreover, the recent problems EU encountered as regarding the some pressing budget issues show that the ‘raison d’état’ is far from vanishing within the ‘post-modern’ Union. Since Dante in his ‘De Monarchia’ repeatedly remembered us that God is always right, and since God has left the nations to last until the end of time, we cannot but assume (as good Christians) that the ‘nation states’ will not disappear, even if one calls them ‘post-modern’ states and even if ‘new empires’ are still to emerge.
Conclusion: How should a small state, such as Romania, deal with the ‘post-modern’ statehood dilemma?
It is of more interest for us (i.e. those living in a country which tries to become a ‘new democracy’, after it survived the Communist era) to understand how to deal with such complex geopolitical environment. For example, we shall evoke Romania’s case – this because he who writes these study is a Romanian. Romania recently became a NATO member and, besides, it enjoys a kind of privileged partnership with the US regarding some Eastern-European region’s strategic issues. Therefore, Romania joined NATO intervention in Afghanistan, joined the US-led ‘alliance of the willing’ in Iraq, and recently green-lighted the set-up of US military facilities on its territory. In August 2002 Romania went against its commitments to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by becoming the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States exempting American nationals from ICC jurisdiction.
On another hand, Romanian is undertaking the EU membership bid, with a formal accession deadline in 2007. In order to meet the EU standards, Romania implemented the ‘acquis communautaire’ and privatised the state-owned economy by selling out all its strategic assets (banking, utilities, oil industry, etc) to EU companies – those having the means and the know-how to bring the ‘post-modern’ management to the country. These macroeconomic and medium to long term projections form the main group of arguments presented by advocates of EU integration. Nevertheless there are key elements missing from the mainstream debate which would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the implications of EU integration. The immediate social costs of EU membership are usually only presented indirectly while EU officials are continuously showing red flags to Romania by asking the country to speed institutional and environmental reforms whose price is too high for country to perform amid the ongoing EU budget cuts. Moreover, EU politicians and media often criticise or at least tease Romania for its corruption and its close relationship with US. As about corruption, we think this is more a matter of ‘style’, as long as the EU leaders easily forget that some 10 years ago the EU was confronted with a $12 billion fraud in its agricultural programmes – to date, Romania is repeatedly accused of ‘high level’ corruption but the figures in question are in the range of tens of millions and the information on corruption is mainly extracted from the local media.
Located in the EU ‘limes’, Romania is currently paying the highest price for the Russian gas – as compared to any European country –, and no one in the ‘post-modern EU’ seems to notice. Moreover, while Romania struggled years in a row to be awarded the ‘functional market economy’ status, EU gives Ukraine the same status in one year (i.e. 2005), as Ukraine’s gas supplies were practically subsidised by Russia and the possible end of such subsidising would lead to its economical collapse eventually – not to mention what disastrous consequences a Russian-Ukrainian energy dispute would bring to the freshly ‘post-modern’ Europe.
What would Romania do under the circumstances? The country cannot give up the long awaited help of the Western huge geopolitical actors (i.e. America and Europe). USA is providing Romania with the security that EU is not able to come up with, though even if US managed to push Romania into NATO, it cannot force EU to generously boost the Romanian economy. Romania’s dilemma stands as a paradigmatic example of a small state complex relationship with the Western two-headed ‘post-modern’ emerging empire.
By Mihai D. Popescu - Dec 29, 2005
_________________
1) Andrew J. Bacevich: The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005)
2) Charles S. Maier: Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Harvard University Press, 2005)
3) Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Gifford Lectures - Princeton University Press, 2004)
4) Dinesh D’Souza: What's So Great About America (Penguin Books; Reissue edition, 2003)
5) Robert Kagan: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Knopf; 1st edition, 2003)
6) Sebastian Mallaby: The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002)
7) Robert Cooper: The Post-Modern State (in ‘Re-Ordering the World’; The Foreign Policy Centre, London 2002)
8) Mihai D. Popescu: The Post-Modern Pragmatics (paper; proceedings of World Architecture Congress “Interarch-83”, Sofia 1983)
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